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1. Introduction: Taking stock of existing key findings 
 
To know where we are going, we need to know where we stand and where we come from. I will 
thus first describe in the current introduction section 1 the main existing results in the literature 
on the economics of conflict and peace.
2
 After this, I will describe in section 2 what the main 
cutting-edge lines of research and emerging trends are, and will then in section 3 offer some 
conclusions and formulate –somewhat more speculative– views on which turn the literature may 
be taking in the coming years. 
 
Costs and consequences of conflict 
 
The first question to always ask before plunging into a research topic is whether it is relevant and 
important enough for international scholars to study it. Thus, we shall start below by summarizing why 
conflicts are a major problem requiring our attention. 
Human lives lost 
The foremost cost of conflict is, of course, in terms of human lives. Between 1945 and 1999 an 
estimated 3.3 million people got killed in 25 interstate wars, and 16.2 million direct fatalities took place 
in 127 civil wars (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Diseases and other indirect effects more than double this 
death toll (Ghobarah et al., 2003). Much violence also occurs away from the battlefield, when armed 
troops turn their weapons against defenseless civilians. Since World War II some 50 episodes of mass 
killings have led to between 12 and 25 million civilian casualties (Political Instability Task Force, 2010), 
involving in many cases the governments attacking political or ethnic minority groups among the 
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population, as for example during the infamous Stalinist purges, the massacres committed by the Red 
Khmer in Cambodia, and, more recently, the ethnic cleansing in Sudan’s Darfur region. 
Monetary costs 
Also the economic costs of conflict are large: Civil wars tend to reduce growth by 2.3 percent per year, 
so the average civil war which lasts about 7 years reduces GDP by about 15 percent (Collier, 2007). 
Taking into account the direct and indirect costs of a civil war, as well as spillovers to neighboring states, 
Collier (2007) estimates the cost of a typical civil war at around $ 64 billion. Not only major civil wars, 
such as the Second Congo War from 1998-2003 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) killing 
millions, have a major impact on the economy. Even comparatively mild forms of civil wars and 
terrorism, such as for example the conflicts in the Basque Country and in Northern Ireland leave crucial 
footprints on the local economy. When estimating the costs of terrorism in the Basque country between 
1955 and 1995 by comparing it to a weighted average of comparable Spanish regions, Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) show that Basque GDP would be 10% higher today if ETA’s armed struggle had not 
happened. 
Other consequences of war 
It is of course important to bear in mind that the costs of conflict are not just limited to death tolls and 
economic losses. There is substantial evidence that conflict harms physical and mental health (see e.g. 
Barenbaum et al., 2004) and that it drives down schooling and long-run educational outcomes (see e.g. 
Shemyakina, 2011). Finally, warfare also affects trust, political participation, and future crime behavior 
in the aftermath of conflict. There is still a lively debate on the societal impact of war, with some papers 
finding that conflict drives down inter-group trust (Rohner et al., 2013), and makes war victims more 
likely to engage in crime or conflict later in life (Couttenier et al., 2016; Rohner et al., 2013b), while 
other papers conclude that conflict boosts local collective action (see the survey of Bauer et al., 2016). 
Causes of conflict 
Ethnic strive 
Recent research shows that ethnic and religious diversity are a main driver of conflict. Economists have 
early on started to look for measures that capture the importance of ethnic diversity. While also ethnic 
fractionalization (which is increasing in the number of groups) has been found to correlate positively 
with conflict, the strongest effect has been found from ethnic polarization (which is largest in a bipolar 
distribution of two similarly sized groups facing each other) (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; 
Rohner, 2011; Esteban et al., 2012). 
Resource curse 
Another empirical regularity that has received a lot of attention in recent years is that many resource-
rich countries are poor (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). This at first sight 
paradoxical correlation between natural resource abundance and poverty has been dubbed the 
“resource curse”. The channels that fuel the conflict-inducing impact of Mother Nature’s riches are 
manifold as well. First, and most obviously, it becomes more lucrative to conquer a place with more 
valuable resources to capture (which has been found by many papers, e.g. Lei and Michaels, 2014). 
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Another important reason why oil and other resources can be dangerous for peace is that often they are 
not evenly distributed in a given country. It is hence not only the total amount of natural resources that 
matters but how they are distributed over the territory (Morelli and Rohner, 2015). The most dangerous 
situation is when most natural resource fields are concentrated in the ethnic homelands of ethnic 
minority groups that would be economically better off from splitting from the rest of the country. 
Asymmetries in resource holdings have also been drivers of various militarized interstate disputes in the 
past decades (Caselli et al., 2015). 
Besides fueling the risk of civil and interstate wars between armed groups, oil has also been found to 
make massacres of civilians more lucrative for cynical governments (Esteban et al., 2015). The 
government’s terrifying trade-off is as follows: When reducing the size of a minority group (by mass 
killings or expulsion), the government can increase its share of national wealth to appropriate, but at the 
same time the size of the economy shrinks (as less people produce less). When most of the national 
economy relies on productive labor, the output is reduced so substantially after massacres that they 
typically do not pay off for the government. In contrast, the extraction of natural resources requires only 
relatively little local labor, hence in states with natural resource extraction accounting for a large share 
of GDP, national output shrinks relatively less after massacres, making the latter relatively more 
lucrative for cynical governments. 
The bad news continues, as natural resource abundance does not only increase the likelihood of political 
violence taking place, but also its diffusion and length. According to the “feasibility hypothesis”, resource 
money constitutes not only the “prize” or “pie” to appropriate, but also helps paying for the fighting 
while it happens. In the absence of perfect capital markets, looting of resource rents allows rebels to 
fund their cause, expand their zone of activity, and spread violence over a greater area and for a longer 
time. Recent evidence in line with this view is e.g. provided by the study of the conflict-inducing effect of 
mineral wealth by Berman et al. (2017). 
Besides these direct effects, there are also several indirect ways in which natural resources boost the 
conflict risk by undermining the state and the economy. To start with, “rentier states” have less of a 
need to build up fiscal capacity and a tax collection apparatus than other states, and hence they tend to 
become weaker states with less state capacity and less efficient bureaucracies (Besley and Persson, 
2011). Further, by its very nature, natural resource exploitation often requires very substantial amounts 
of capital. While increased mineral and oil and gas prices lead to a boom in the capital-intensive 
extraction industry, other, more labor-intensive sectors suffer from less capital, which leads to a drop in 
wages, and hence reduced opportunity costs of fighting, as shown by Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2011) and Dube 
and Vargas (2013). 
Plight of poverty 
For many years, political scientists and economists have documented the positive correlation between 
poverty and fighting. More recently, making use of rain fall deviations from the mean, a series of papers 
have shown that a rise in poverty (i.e. due to drought driving down agricultural yields) fuels the risk of 
conflict (see e.g. Miguel et al., 2004). 
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2. Cutting edge and emerging trends 
 
After having singled out above some major consequences and causes of conflict established in the 
existing literature, I shall now below focus on a series of emerging trends. 
Addressing statistical biases: Disaggregation and Creation of New Data 
The trend of focusing on putting together novel kinds of data has already started about ten years ago. 
While the pioneering work of Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have highlighted 
various correlates of conflict, many of the existing variables at that point of time were time invariant, 
such as e.g. ethnic diversity measures, or the shares of land covered by mountainous terrain, or did not 
vary much over time. This means that much of the statistical variation has lied in the cross-section of 
countries. The statistical pitfall of this is the concern of potential omitted variable bias and unobserved 
heterogeneity, as it is close to impossible to control for all dimensions in which countries differ. Further, 
in many countries conflict are localized in some part, e.g. the Niger delta in Nigeria or FARC-controlled 
areas in Colombia. Hence, by carrying out an analysis at the country level, much statistical noise is 
added.  
The quest of causal identification and for reducing unobserved heterogeneity has led scholars to 
consider a variety of avenues. While a small number of papers have focused on exploiting exogenous 
variation at the country level (see e.g. Miguel et al., 2004, making use of variation in country-level rain 
fall), many papers in recent years have focused on exploiting within-country variation. Given that 
nationwide institutions are identical within countries and that overall unobserved heterogeneity is 
typically smaller for within-country studies in a variety of dimensions, focusing on different regions of a 
given country reduces the risk of “comparing apples with pears”. Recent articles using geo-graphically 
disaggregated data to explain the causes and impact of conflict include, among many others, Cederman 
et al. (2009), Cassar et al. (2013), Dube and Vargas (2013), La Ferrara and Harari (2014), Michalopoulos 
and Papaioannou (2017), Berman et al. (2017), and Mueller et al. (2017). 
Working with disaggregate data does not only serve the purpose of reducing unobserved heterogeneity, 
but at the same time allows to create new sets of variables that previously have not been available. New 
variables of course also means new ways of testing existing or new theories. For example, 
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2017) have created a novel measure of partitioned ethnic groups, and 
La Ferrara and Harari (2014) have computed agriculture-relevant shocks, taking into account the local 
crop coverage and growing seasons. Such variables would have been impossible to put together without 
drawing on disaggregate data. 
Letting Theory Guide the Empirics 
In recent years there have been several papers trying to create a tight link between a new theory and 
novel evidence testing the theory. To name a few contributions, Besley and Persson (2011) have built a 
formal model of how a variety of political and economic variables related to state capacity affect the risk 
of conflict and have presented empirical findings in line with the key predictions of the model. Similarly, 
also Dube and Vargas (2013) start from a theoretical model predicting contrasting effects of price shocks 
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depending on whether they occur in labor-or capital-intensive sectors and test this using Colombian 
data to assess the impact of price shocks for labor-intensive commodities (coffee) versus shocks to 
capital-intensive sectors (oil). Another example of research linking theory to empirics is Caselli et al. 
(2015) who build a model of how distance of oil wells from international borders affect the risk of inter-
state conflicts, and test the predictions of the model, putting together novel data on oil location for all 
county pairs around the world. 
Some papers also focus on estimating directly the coefficients of a structural model (i.e. they start from 
a mathematical model and make use of the empirical data to compute the values of the variables of the 
model). For example, König et al. (2017) integrate network spillovers into a contest model, allowing 
predicting the impact of increased fighting effort of allies and enemies. These spillover parameters are 
then structurally estimated, exploiting exogenous variation in rainfall. Similarly, Mueller et al. (2017) 
build a model of how distance to potential targets affects recruiting efforts and attacks by sectarian 
paramilitary groups, and then estimate the spatial weight coefficients of the model using disaggregate 
data from Northern Ireland. They conclude that there are indeed large transport costs of violence and 
that changing distances between conflict parties can explain a large drop in violence. 
Being Policy Relevant 
Up to recently, many of the papers in the literature have focused on drivers of conflict that are easily 
measurable and relatively exogenous, such as for example natural resource abundance, ethnic 
polarization, and exogenous income variations (as discussed above). Policy and institutions of course 
also matter heavily for conflict. However, policy-related determinants of conflict are by their very nature 
harder to measure and plagued by endogeneity problems. Put bluntly, while variations in, say, rain are 
to a large extent driven by exogenous factors linked to mother nature, variations in policies like, say, 
education or health spending, are to a large extent the product of endogenous human choices, and it is 
harder to find some random variation allowing a clean statistical identification of causality. This may be 
one of the reasons why the role of policies and institutions for preventing conflict and favoring 
successful post-war reconstruction has –up to recently-- received far less attention in the literature. In 
recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in being able to study policy-relevant 
questions. 
First of all, the impact of institutions has received some attention in recent years. Most empirical papers 
have found democracy to be a double-edged knife, at the same time reducing grievances against the 
state, but enabling potential opponents to more easily coordinate anti-government action. In particular, 
there is evidence for an "inverted U-shape", i.e. "anocracies" with intermediate democracy scores fare 
worst (Hegre et al., 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Collier and Rohner (2008) find that in poor countries 
the conflict-inducing effects of democracy dominate, while in rich countries the peace-promoting 
channels dominate. While democracy remains very attractive for all countries, the fragility of poor 
democracies calls for support by the international community to alleviate poverty and increase the 
opportunity cost of fighting. Moreover, Besley and Persson (2011) have emphasized the role of 
institutional constraints for peace by dealing with economic shocks. Power-sharing has received 
increasing attention recently. Cederman et al. (2013) show that ethnic groups included in government 
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show less propensity to engage in insurgency, and Mueller and Rohner (2017) find that power-sharing 
reduces the scope for sectarian violence, using novel data from Northern Ireland. 
Not just institutions but also specific policies have received a resurging interest, with for example 
Berman et al. (2017) showing that transparency initiatives for declaring mineral origins as well as good 
corporate social responsibility of mining firms can curb conflict. König et al. (2017) have found that while 
arms embargoes may in many cases not be sufficient to drive down fighting, bilateral reconciliation and 
trying to demobilize keyplayer groups in the network can be promising in pacification. Nunn and Qian 
(2015) find that US food aid had in many cases rather a neutral or harmful than positive impact on 
pacification, while Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011) have shown that subsidizing productive labor can play a key 
role at promoting peace. Couttenier et al. (2016) find that the negative consequences of war exposure in 
terms of future violent behavior can be countered by promoting labor market access and integration in 
the society. 
Very recently, there is also a trend towards using randomized control trials (RCT)3 to study policy 
relevant interventions. Cilliers et al. (2016) have treated some village with reconciliation meetings in a 
post-conflict context while not holding such meeting in the control group. They have found that such 
meetings indeed increase social capital but decrease individual well-being. Focusing similalry on post-
conflict reconstruction, Annan and Blattman (2016) study the reintegration of “high-risk men” (many of 
whome being former combatants) in a post-conflict context. 
3. Conclusions and Forecast 
When children grow up they become more mature. The same can be seen in economic literatures on 
particular topics and fields. Trade economics and labor economics, for example, have become ever more 
sophisticated over the last few decades, pushing further the causal identification, reducing statistical 
biases, using more disaggregate data, allowing a tighter link between theory and empirics and studying 
in an as clean as possible way the impact of particular policies. Conflict and peace economics is going 
down the same route. While it is a younger literature –at least in economics– it is catching up rapidly in 
terms of methodological sophistication and is in many aspects even leap-frogging – going beyond the 
gold standards of other literatures, for example as far as the use of geo-referenced data is concerned. 
While in terms of causal identification the conflict and peace literature has already reached a high level 
of sophistication, the main catching up needed is in terms of being able to give useful advice to 
policymakers as far as the evaluation of particular policies is concerned. So far, we do not know enough 
on what mix of policies can curb conflict and it is in this dimension where I expect the biggest progress in 
the coming years. Of course, one needs to bear in mind that studying policies is particularly hard as far 
as conflict is concerned, given that the stakes are so high, and experimenting with policies is in many 
cases not possible. Still, RCTs can be an option when it comes to things such as reconciliation initiatives, 
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reintegration coaching, further professional training for former combatants and when the interest from 
potential participants is much larger than the available budget. In this case, randomization of access may 
be ethically defendable and allows a clean impact evaluation. We still know far too little about how to 
successfully promote post-conflict reconstruction, so studies on this are very much encouraged.  
A good alternative to RCTs is also to exploit existing random variation in policies. When for example a 
knife-edge electoral victory close to the 50% votes threshold decides on the adoption or not of a given 
policy or when a given policy reform is for exogenous (e.g. budgetary reasons) not implemented in all 
parts of a country at the same time, then again this allows for relatively clean statistical identification of 
causality. In my opinion it is very worthwhile to focus much more on searching for such quasi-natural 
experiments to study the impact of policies on conflict. 
While studying conflict and peace is hard, it is well worth the effort, as also the rewards of reducing 
somewhat the human suffering from fighting would be extremely high. 
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